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Abstract 
This paper examines the discretionary ‘family provision’ jurisdiction in England and 
Wales. It considers how the criteria governing eligibility to make a claim, and the 
principles and rationales underlying the exercise of the court’s powers, shed light 
on what we understand as ‘family’ relationships and the fluidity between family 
structure and family practices. It argues that the law can and does operate 
dynamically and responsively to determine which kinds of relationships and what 
qualities of emotional or supportive bonds, should be recognised as giving rise to a 
‘sense of obligation’ to provide financial support after a death in the family.  
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Resumen 
Este artículo analiza la jurisdicción las "provisiones familiares" discrecionales en 
Inglaterra y Gales. Considera que los criterios de elegibilidad para presentar una 
reclamación, y los principios y razones que subyacen bajo el ejercicio de los 
poderes del tribunal, arrojan luz sobre lo que entendemos como relaciones 
“familiares” y la fluidez entre la estructura familiar y las prácticas familiares. Se 
argumenta que la ley puede, y de hecho opera, de forma dinámica y responsable 
para determinar qué tipo de relaciones y qué cualidades tienen los vínculos 
emocionales o de apoyo, y se debe reconocer que genera “un sentido de obligación” 
de prestar apoyo financiero después de una muerte en la familia. 
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1. Introduction 
The difficulty, of course, is to discover a system sufficiently elastic to enable a 
testator to disinherit his undeserving family, while yet preventing an unjust father 
or an unfaithful husband from leaving his dependants penniless. (Keeton and Gower 
1935, p. 329) 
This paper argues that the discretionary ‘family provision’ jurisdiction in England 
and Wales is at the forefront of dealing with the problems the law faces in squaring 
the traditional conception of what constitutes a family and what constitute 
appropriate family rights and obligations, with a radically changing social and 
attitudinal landscape in which ‘new’ forms of family life and family behaviour are 
increasingly prominent. It suggests that the eligibility criteria of the jurisdiction, 
coupled with the principles and rationales underlying the exercise of the discretion 
it bestows on the courts, can be understood as delineating what we understand as 
‘family’ relationships, and shed light on the fluidity between ideas of family 
‘structure’ and family ‘practice’. In so doing, it draws on the work of David Morgan 
in emphasizing the importance of recognizing the family as that which is constituted 
by ‘doing’ rather than ‘being’, and of Janet Finch in determining the nature of 
‘obligation’ between family members. Thus, what has been described elsewhere as 
the ‘inheritance family’ (Douglas et al. 2011) – those family members (or others) 
who are recognized within the group, including by the deceased, as appropriately 
having an entitlement to share in a person’s estate - is shaped by notions of 
obligation, commitment and ‘appropriate’ familial behaviour, which are determined 
both by the moral and cultural values underpinning the statute and case-law and by 
the individual circumstances operating in particular families and between particular 
family members.  
The paper begins by providing a brief description of what Morgan (2011) has in 
mind in referring to ‘family practices’, and Finch’s (1989) conclusions on how family 
obligations are recognized, and then gives an outline of the family provision 
jurisdiction in England and Wales. It shows how ideas of family structure and family 
behaviour are both used to determine the eligibility rules which delimit the range of 
‘family’ relationships recognized as giving rise to a claim. It goes on to examine the 
orders that can be made and the factors taken into account through a discussion of 
the key case-decisions which elaborate the statutory provisions. I hope to show 
through this examination of how inheritance law is applied by the courts the light it 
can shed on our understanding of what constitutes ‘family’ in late modern society, 
and thus seek to move it from the periphery of family law scholarship closer to its 
core.  
2. Theorizing the family – family ‘practices’ and family obligations 
It has long been accepted by scholars of ‘the family’ that the term itself is a 
contested one. We are familiar with the limitations of viewing the family as a formal 
or structural entity, demarcated by legal ties or traditional kin bonds. Yet the 
‘functional’ view of the family is also problematic, since a focus on function risks 
failing to establish any boundaries at all between what is described as pertaining to 
the family and what could equally be classed as intimacy, friendship or affect. David 
Morgan’s work goes some way to meeting these objections. Morgan offers the 
concept of ‘doing family’, or of ‘family practices’ as a way of theorizing about family 
life (rather than constructing a theory of the family). He suggests that we avoid 
using the word ‘family’ solely or primarily as a noun, but think of it instead as an 
adjective – ‘as a lens through which to describe and to explore a set of social 
activities’ or even think of it as a verb. For Morgan (2011, p. 5-6), a ‘focus on 
doing, on activities, moves us away from ideas of the family as relatively static 
structures or sets of positions or statuses.’ In developing this approach, he draws 
upon Bourdieu, who also contrasted formal kinship rules (‘a language of 
prescriptions and rules’) with ‘practical kinship’ – shaped by practical and everyday 
concerns and considerations (Bourdieu 1990, p. 163, 168). Thus, Morgan concludes 
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(2011, p. 163), ‘family practices are reflective practices; in being enacted they 
simultaneously construct, reproduce family boundaries, family relationships and 
possibly more discursive notions of the family in general.’ 
This approach, focusing on what people do as part of their lived family experience, 
whom they regard as part of ‘their’ family, and how that impacts on their behaviour 
towards them, is helpful in explaining how and why statute and case-law governing 
family provision are articulated as they are. It enables us to demarcate who counts 
for the purposes of family provision as ‘family’ and what is the nature and extent of 
the obligation that may be imposed in consequence. However, it is important to 
note that this is not, and cannot be, a purely subjective investigation into particular 
individuals and their families. Clearly, the law has to lay down rules and guidelines 
to apply in general. Thus, as Morgan understands, there are ‘various ways in which 
law and family are intertwined, with the law, to some extent, reflecting widespread 
assumptions about family roles and responsibilities while, at the same time, also 
shaping and influencing these everyday domestic practices.’ (Morgan 2011, p. 28). 
In empirical work which included the scrutiny of practices and attitudes concerning 
inheritance, Janet Finch found that assistance, including financial support, from 
relatives is of considerable importance to many people, but that it is unpredictable 
in the sense that it cannot be assumed (or presumed) that in any given relationship 
(e.g. father and daughter), support will be provided. The ‘appropriateness of 
offering a particular type of assistance is something to be weighed up and judged in 
particular circumstances, and to be negotiated between the parties concerned.’ 
(Finch 1989, p. 239)  
Finch also argues that the principle of reciprocity: 
is the key to understanding how patterns of support build up over time. An 
expectation that assistance should flow in two directions, and that no one should 
end up in a position where they are receiving more than they are giving, is at the 
heart of many of the negotiations which take place about support in families (Finch 
1989, p. 240). 
We will see that, in deciding whether a claim for family provision should be upheld, 
the principle of reciprocity is not straightforward. On the one hand, the legislation 
appears to require a distinct lack of such reciprocity to justify a claim; on the other, 
in exploring how judges actually decide on the merits of a case, the extent to which 
care and support were mutually exchanged may appear a significant factor.  
Finch goes on to identify a ‘sense of obligation’ as the key defining characteristic of 
family ties, but it is an obligation derived from normative guidelines concerned with 
how to work out what to do, rather than laying down what should be done. 
Moreover, it depends upon the nature of the relationship between the individuals 
concerned, derived from the commitments they have built up over time. Again, this 
is helpful in explaining why judges conclude that some claims should succeed, and 
others fail, in the light of the behaviour and emotional quality of the relationship 
between the claimant and the deceased.  
3. The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 
By the law of England everyone is left free to choose the person upon whom he will 
bestow his property after death entirely unfettered in the selection he may think 
proper to make. He may disinherit, either wholly or partially, his children, and leave 
his property to strangers to gratify his spite, or to charities to gratify his pride, and 
we must give effect to his will, however much we may condemn the course he has 
pursued.1 
As is well known, English law permits complete freedom of testation (subject to 
rules regarding capacity, formalities, undue influence etc), though such freedom 
                                                 
1 Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P&D 64 per Sir James Hannen P. 
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does not date back as far as is often thought – only to the beginning of the 20th 
century (Keeton and Gower 1935, Dainow 1940, Green 1988).2 As Melanie Leslie 
has noted, the apparently dominant principle of testamentary freedom may in fact 
be heavily circumscribed by courts ‘committed to ensuring that testators devise 
their estates in accordance with prevailing normative views’ (Leslie 1996, p. 236). 
Disposition of assets on death has a moral and social as well as an economic 
purpose, and probate law can be used to promote norms which reflect and endorse 
those relationships (particularly ‘family’ relationships) which are deemed worthy, 
and dismiss or reject those regarded as less deserving or desirable. Where the 
jurisdiction concerned provides a statutory remedy for disinheritance – as is the 
case in England and Wales – these norms can be promoted through an appropriate 
claim. But where, as in the USA, there is no such remedial jurisdiction, courts may 
be more particular about finding defects in the form of a will which would serve to 
nullify it, or readier to uphold claims of undue influence, where the will appears to 
ignore or reject the testator’s moral duty to those ‘whom the court views as having 
a superior moral claim to the testator’s assets’ (Leslie 1996, p. 237). The intestacy 
rules provide another illustration of the promotion of particular moral and social 
norms in delineating who is regarded as deserving of a share in an estate. 
In England and Wales, a person who regards herself as unfairly treated either under 
a will or through the operation of the intestacy rules may make a claim under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 Act, if she fits within 
the eligibility criteria (Green 1988, Matthews 2009). The introduction of a 
discretionary regime (originally in 1938), rather than the application of forced 
shares, fits an approach to succession which focuses on the individual merits of a 
claim – the underlying rationale is one of remedying hardship rather than upholding 
justice and, like the English financial remedies jurisdiction on divorce, it values the 
flexibility to provide individualized outcomes3 over prior recognition of ‘entitlement’ 
or certainty. Dainow (1940, p. 350) explains that the rationale behind the original 
legislation was to relieve the plight of widows and children otherwise unable to 
support themselves. He comments, in relation to the collection of evidence by a 
joint parliamentary committee in the 1930s, that ‘the most emphasized idea in 
favour of the restriction was the one of providing subsistence rather than the right 
to a fair share of common property.’  
Moreover, as is typical in English family cases, the use of discretion on the part of 
the court to remedy the situation leads to a focus on ‘facts’ in the particular case. 
As an experienced practitioner has put it, ‘There is no single essential factor for the 
success, or failure, of a claim ... All facts may be relevant.’ (Francis 2012, p. 1247). 
This helps explain why an analysis utilising a family practices approach, which 
examines what the court identified as the ‘familial’ quality of the emotional and 
behavioural relationship between claimant and deceased in the given case, may be 
more fruitful in helping explain the decisions reached than one relying instead on a 
structural model, focused on the formal ties between claimant and deceased, or 
even a functional model, which, as noted above, may fail to distinguish between 
actions taken consciously as a ‘family’ member and those taken as a friend or carer. 
3.1. Eligibility to make a claim  
The range of those eligible to apply under the jurisdiction is limited, and tied, to an 
extent, to traditional ideas of the ‘family’ as constituted by marriage and kinship 
(Sloan 2011). However, as will be shown, the notion of ‘dependence’ provides a 
                                                 
2 Keeton and Gower (1935) suggest that the introduction of some sort of fixed share or ‘family provision’ 
law (as we would now call it) would reflect the extension into English law of Roman law principles at that 
time exemplified by the passage of the Legitimacy Act 1926 (which enabled the legitimation of children 
born out of wedlock if their parents subsequently married) and the Adoption of Children Act 1926 (which 
permitted the legal adoption of children for the first time in English law). 
3 But see the differing parliamentary views on the merits of judicial discretion in this area, noted by 
Green (1988, p. 195). 
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lens through which the law can reflect an understanding of family which emanates 
from the importance attached to what people have ‘done’, how they have ‘behaved’ 
towards one another and what they ‘owe’ to each other, rather than what position 
they occupy within a (formal) family structure.  
The following may make an application for provision under s 1(1) of the Act:  
− the spouse or civil partner of the deceased; 
− a former spouse or civil partner (provided they have not formed a 
subsequent marriage or civil partnership); 
− a person who, during the whole of the period of two years immediately 
before the death of the deceased, was living in the same household as the 
deceased as his or her husband or wife, or civil partner;  
− a child of the deceased;  
− any person who in relation to any marriage or civil partnership to which the 
deceased was at any time a party, or otherwise in relation to any family in 
which the deceased at any time stood in the role of a parent, was treated by 
the deceased as a child of the family4; 
− a dependant, defined as any person who, immediately before the death of 
the deceased, was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the 
deceased.  
There are some points worth noting in this list. First, parents or siblings are not 
included as discrete categories of eligible applicant, perhaps because they are not 
assumed to have been dependent upon the deceased. This is in contrast to the 
intestacy rules, where they will take (in that order of priority) if the deceased has 
no surviving spouse or descendants.5 Public attitudinal research (Humphrey et al. 
2010, Ch 4) conducted for the Law Commission of England and Wales when they 
were reviewing the law between 2009 and 2011 showed a strong preference for the 
surviving partner (married or not) and descendants of the deceased over parents 
and siblings, but a recognition of the latter as having claims in the absence of a 
spouse or children where there was felt to be a need for support (in the case of 
elderly parents) or a wish to pass property down the generations via a sibling and 
his or her offspring. The possibility of a parent or sibling seeking family provision 
provided they can show they were dependent on the deceased would appear 
compatible with such attitudes.  
Secondly, any child of the deceased – adult or minor, dependent or independent - 
may apply. Under the forerunner of this Act, only minor children, unmarried 
daughters, or adult children with disabilities, i.e. those assumed to be dependent on 
the deceased, were eligible. The Law Commission considered that it was 
discriminatory to restrict provision to adult daughters but not sons, noting that both 
might face economic hardship which could be relieved from the deceased’s estate.6 
But the extension to all children of the deceased does not mean that the jurisdiction 
is now used to ensure ‘equal shares’ amongst potential child beneficiaries, which, 
empirical evidence demonstrates, is an important value held by the public when 
considering how children should be recognized (Humphrey et al. 2010, p. 33). As I 
discuss later, adult children may still find it difficult to obtain a share of the estate 
under this jurisdiction, on the basis that if they are in fact financially independent 
they are thus not in need of provision from the deceased, and the underlying 
rationale of relieving hardship will not be satisfied.  
                                                 
4 As amended by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 Sch 2 para 2.  
5 Administration of Estates Act 1925 s 46. In fact, a parent or sibling will take part of the estate if there 
is a surviving spouse/civil partner but no issue, once the ‘statutory legacy’ has been apportioned to that 
spouse/partner.  
6 Law Commission (1974) paras 71-79. 
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Another significant difference between the family provision regime and the current 
intestacy rules is the specific inclusion in the Inheritance Act jurisdiction (since 
1995) of cohabitant partners of the deceased if they lived together for at least two 
years. Indeed, the Law Commission in 1989 justified the exclusion of cohabitants 
from automatic provision under the intestacy rules by noting that they could be 
better catered for under the discretionary jurisdiction which could more easily 
determine whether the couple had been cohabiting ‘as husband and wife’. Under 
their more recent proposals, the Law Commission (2011, Ch 8) has now 
recommended their inclusion in the light of very strong public support for this 
(Humphrey et al. 2010 pp 42-47). One might expect some reduction in the number 
of family provision claims should their recommendations be enacted,7 but given the 
controversial nature of cohabitation law reform, this may not be in the very near 
future so the eligibility to make a claim will remain important for some time to 
come. 
Spouses, civil partners, cohabitants and children of the deceased all fit recognizably 
into the standard nuclear family model, albeit one that has been updated to take 
account of the acceptability of both cohabiting and same-sex relationships in late 
modern society, and this closely reflects the social attitudes found in the public 
opinion survey mentioned above (Humphrey et al. 2010, p. 86; Douglas et al. 
2011, pp. 254-256). A child ‘treated by the deceased as a child of the family’ 
means a step-child, and this category therefore provides a further recognition of an 
updated family model which may embrace children who are not the deceased’s 
‘own’ but to whom he or she has stood in the social or psychological position of 
parent (Humphrey et al. 2010, pp.59-60). 
3.2. Dependency as a basis for eligibility  
It is the final category, however, which represents most strongly the 
acknowledgement that claims may be made not on the basis of position within a 
family structure but by virtue of the familial behaviour and practices shared 
between the deceased and the applicant. As noted, a person may apply for 
provision if, immediately before the death of the deceased, he or she was being 
maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased. The key criterion is the 
maintenance of the applicant by the deceased. This marks out that, in contrast to 
Finch’s finding of the importance of reciprocity in shaping family support, what the 
law is interested in is a relationship of asymmetrical dependence which echoes 
traditional assumptions about the nature of family relationships: the applicant has 
to show that they ‘received’ more from the deceased, than they put into the 
relationship. (But it will be noted below that, when it comes to assessing what, if 
any, provision should be made for the applicant, his or her contribution to the 
relationship then becomes relevant). As section 1(3) of the Act states, the applicant 
will be regarded as having been maintained by the deceased only if the latter had 
been making a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards his or 
her reasonable needs other than a contribution made for full valuable consideration 
pursuant to an arrangement of a commercial nature.8 This underscores the 
centrality of hardship and dependency as the relevant factors in an inheritance 
claim.  
This is well illustrated by the leading case, Jelley v Iliffe.9 The applicant, a widower, 
moved in with the deceased, who had been his wife’s sister-in-law, and they lived 
together for a number of years (the applicant could not at that time apply on the 
basis of their ‘cohabitation’ but it was accepted that they probably had lived ‘as 
man and wife’). The deceased’s husband had left the matrimonial home to her 
under a life interest under his will, with their children inheriting it on her death, but 
                                                 
7 Compare Law Commission (2009) para 4.15. 
8 As amended by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 Sch 2 para 3. 
9 [1981] Fam 128. 
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a ‘deed of arrangement’ had been made under which the children had transferred 
the legal title to her on her undertaking to leave it to them on her death. This she 
duly did, and the applicant then applied for provision as her dependant. Stephenson 
LJ held: 
To discover whether the deceased was making [a substantial] contribution the court 
has to balance what she was contributing against what he was contributing, and if 
there is any doubt about the balance tipping in favour of hers being the greater 
contribution, the matter must, in my opinion, go to trial. If, however, the balance is 
bound to come down in favour of his being the greater contribution, or if the 
contributions are clearly equal, there is no dependency of him on her, either 
because she depended on him or there was mutual dependency between them, and 
his application should be struck out now as bound to fail.10 
This is not a straightforward exercise: it entails the making of moral or value 
judgments, or, as the Court of Appeal preferred to say, using ‘common sense’:  
The balancing of imponderables like companionship and other services, on which 
the court has somehow to put a financial value, against contributions of money or 
accommodation, is a hard task … In striking this balance the court must use 
common sense and remember that the object of Parliament in creating this extra 
class of persons who may claim benefit from an estate was to provide relief for 
persons of whom it could truly be said that they were wholly or partially dependent 
on the deceased. … Each case will have to be looked at carefully on its own facts to 
see whether common sense leads to the conclusion that the applicant can fairly be 
regarded as a dependant.11 
This ‘balance sheet approach’ has been criticised as it requires the applicant’s 
contribution to be less than that of the deceased if he or she is to be able to claim, 
and it fails to recognise interdependency: as Kerridge and Brierley (2009, para 
8.79) have put it, ‘It does seem odd that an applicant who claims to have been a 
dependant will benefit from demonstrating that he or she was slothful and 
uncaring’. Stereotyping is perhaps less obvious nowadays than it was when this 
case was decided, 30 years ago, but then, the applicant’s own role in ‘rendering 
services by looking after the garden and being a man about the house, doing 
various odd jobs and some internal decoration’ was contrasted with the deceased’s 
‘doing the cooking and cleaning’.12 Bound up in these judgments is an assumption 
of what people ‘do’ for each other in intimate or family relationships. Indeed, the 
comparison of the housewife role with that of the paid housekeeper demonstrates 
very clearly the assumption of altruistic caring which lies at the heart of the role of 
‘partner’ (or at least, ‘female’ partner).  
Mirroring the explanation by Leslie (1996) of American decisions on the validity of 
wills, noted above, the camouflaging of the moral judgments implicit in the 
jurisdiction is also accomplished, as has been pointed out by Kate Green (1988, p. 
200), through resort to somewhat technical interpretation of the statute. For 
example, it has been unclear if it must be established that not only was the 
deceased making payments or otherwise providing financial benefits to the 
applicant (e.g. providing accommodation),13 but that he or she had also ‘assumed 
responsibility’ for doing so, that is, that the deceased had recognized he or she had 
an obligation to do so.14 Such ‘assumption of responsibility’ is a relevant factor in 
determining what provision should be made, assuming the claimant is eligible, but 
the question of whether it is relevant to determining such eligibility has been 
                                                 
10 Jelley v Iliffe [1981], p. 138. 
11 Jelley v Iliffe [1981], p. 138E (per Stephenson LJ) and p. 141 (per Griffiths LJ), emphasis added.  
12 Jelley v Iliffe[1981] Fam 128 at pp. 142-143. 
13 Bishop v Plumley [1991] 1 All ER 236, CA; Graham v Murphy [1997] 1 FLR 860 (male cohabitant living 
in deceased’s house at her expense); Rees v Newbery and the Institute of Cancer Research [1998] 1 FLR 
1041 (applicant living in flat owned by the deceased at substantially below the market rent). 
14 Re Beaumont [1980] Ch 444. 
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unclear. In Jelley v Iliffe, Court of Appeal held that it can be presumed from the fact 
of maintaining the applicant.15 
In Baynes v Hedger16 this was taken to mean that such assumption of responsibility 
must be established to found eligibility (thus perhaps respecting testamentary 
freedom by enabling a testator to preserve the estate from a claim by declining to 
assume responsibility towards the potential claimant) and there, the presumption 
was rebutted (Monk 2011, pp. 241-243). A successful sculptor had a forty-year 
close relationship with another woman, although they lived separately for most of 
that time, and the woman had several children. The sculptor was financially 
generous to both the woman and her children over the years, and provided 
extensive support to one child in particular, her god-daughter, purchasing a flat for 
her and paying off a series of large debts. After several years, she told the god-
daughter she would no longer help her other than by way of loans. The god-
daughter pressed her to make provision for her in her will, but at the time of her 
death, she had not done so other than by way of a small legacy, specifying that the 
god-daughter had already benefited and should receive no further provision. She 
left the family landed estate to a charity and the god-daughter made a claim under 
s 1(1)(e). The Court of Appeal allowed the charity’s appeal against the trial judge’s 
finding that the god-daughter was eligible to claim.  
In so doing, the Court affirmed the approach of the first instance judge in assessing 
both how far the deceased had shown an ‘assumption of responsibility’ towards the 
applicant, and the nature of the conduct of the applicant towards the deceased. In 
conducting this assessment, both courts applied understandings of what a familial 
relationship consists of. For example, they found that the deceased  
was a quasi-parental figure to all of her partner’s children and exerted a dominant 
role within their family. …She showed considerable generosity to each of them.17 
The applicant  
went to see [the deceased] …, at the suggestion of a friend, in order to encourage 
[her] to take responsibility for [the applicant] as a parent would.18 (emphasis 
added).  
The very term, ‘god-daughter’ of course implies a quasi-familial role and 
relationship between the deceased and the applicant.  
On the other hand, in rejecting the first instance judge’s conclusion that she was 
being ‘maintained’, the Court of Appeal gave weight to the evidence that the 
applicant’s repeated calls for assistance on the deceased led her to adopt a different 
approach, with the sums of money she provided increasingly described as ‘loans’ 
rather than ‘gifts’. At first instance, the judge noted as ‘distasteful’ the applicant’s 
argument now that these were ‘soft loans’, meaning loans without interest, which 
would never be enforced, and were, to the deceased’s knowledge, unlikely to be 
repaid,19 when she had protested at the time to the deceased that ‘she did not 
want gifts or handouts and that she intended to repay’. He concluded that her 
behaviour was ‘not conduct which, in my judgment, should be rewarded.’20 We can 
see from such dicta that the courts’ conception of what would have been an 
appropriate relationship between the god-daughter and the deceased would have 
                                                 
15 Jelley v Iliffe [1981] Fam 128, 137. They therefore reinstated the applicant’s claim, which had been 
struck out, without deciding on the facts whether it succeeded or not. The Law Commission (2011, para 
6.59) recommended that it be made clear that the assumption of responsibility need not be proved in 
order to be eligible to claim, although it should continue to be a relevant factor in assessing whether 
there was a failure to make reasonable provision and if so, what provision should be made. This has 
been done by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 Sch 2 para 5(4). 
16 Baynes v Hedger [2009] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 2 FLR 767 at [46]. 
17 Baynes v Hedger [2009] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 2 FLR 767 at [10]. 
18 Baynes v Hedger [2009] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 2 FLR 767 at [16]. 
19 Baynes v Hedger [2009] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 2 FLR 767 at [36]. 
20 Baynes v Hedger [2009] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 2 FLR 767 at [49]. 
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been based on grateful acceptance on the part of the god-daughter rather than a 
sense of entitlement.  
                                                
4. Reasonable provision 
Once eligibility is established, the court is then required to undertake a two-stage 
exercise. Under sections 2(1) and 3(1) it must first determine whether the 
deceased’s will or the law relating to intestacy made reasonable financial provision 
for the applicant.21 If it is found that reasonable provision was not made, the court 
will then go on to decide what, if any, orders to make in order to afford such 
reasonable provision. But while the courts might expect the applicant to be 
‘deserving’ (as the applicant in Baynes v Hedger was not), it is not the purpose of 
the Act merely to enable the court to provide legacies or rewards for meritorious 
conduct.22 In considering how the courts evaluate the question of what is 
reasonable provision, we can again see the application of notions and judgments 
regarding appropriate family behaviour and resulting obligation. As the Court of 
Appeal stressed in Ilott v Mitson, what is required is a ‘value judgment’ or 
‘qualitative decision’ by the judge.23 
As is common in the discretionary family jurisdictions, the Act employs a checklist 
approach in section 3 to how the court is to determine whether reasonable financial 
provision has been made. The list of factors relevant to all applications is as follows 
(section 3(1)):  
(a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is 
likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an 
order … has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the 
estate of the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any 
applicant for an order … or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the 
deceased; 
(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased; 
(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant … or any beneficiary of the 
estate of the deceased; 
(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, 
which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant. 
This list is, on one level, value-neutral. It does not tell the court whether the 
financial needs of the applicant should carry more weight than the resources of 
other beneficiaries; it does not suggest that the obligations owed by the deceased 
outweigh the conduct of the applicant towards him or her. On the other hand, it is 
only value-neutral up to a point, since it could have included other factors in which 
different values would have been implicit: for example, it could have referred to the 
closeness (defined either in kin or emotional terms) of the relationship between the 
claimant and deceased, or to the extent to which the claimant had him or herself 
maintained the deceased or provided other support. What it does do is enable the 
court to consider the circumstances of the deceased, the claimant, and the 
beneficiaries in the round, providing scope to contrast the relationship between the 
deceased and the claimant with that which he or she enjoyed with other family 
members. Where the estate is left to charity, as in Baynes v Hedger,24 the court’s 
 
21 For a clear example of failure to make reasonable provision, see Hanbury v Hanbury [1999] 2 FLR 255 
(county court) where the deceased bequeathed his seriously disabled daughter by his first marriage only 
£10,000 whilst his second wife had assets of over £260,000. 
22 Re Coventry [1980] Ch 461 at 486 and 495. 
23 [2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] 2 FLR 172 at [27]. 
24 See also Ilott v Mitson[2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] 2 FLR 172 discussed below. 
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consideration of the checklist also enables the inclusion of social and cultural norms 
of family obligation to assess whether the claimant’s circumstances should outweigh 
the testator’s freedom to bequeath property outside the family entirely.25 
The cases on the application of these factors fall into three main categories, all 
highlighting tensions between traditional and more modern ideas of family and all 
demonstrating how family structure interacts with family practice in identifying the 
scope of legal recognition of claims on the deceased’s estate. 
The first are cases concerning disputes between surviving spouses and children 
(very often of a former relationship) or other blood relatives of the deceased. Here, 
the well-known competition between the claim of the surviving spouse and those of 
‘issue’ or ‘kin’ highlights the shift towards giving priority to the widow/er in western 
inheritance laws, and the dilemma that the growth in multiple families from 
different relationships creates in doing justice as between the spouse and such 
children (Castelain et al. 2009).  
The second category concerns similar claims by cohabiting partners; English law 
currently fails to recognize the cohabitant as entitled automatically to a share in the 
estate despite many cohabiting relationships being the functional equivalents of 
marriage. The discretionary jurisdiction provides a means of providing such 
recognition pending full acknowledgement of cohabitation through the intestacy 
rules.  
The third involves claims by adult children, some of whom have been characterized 
by Kerridge and Brierley (2009, para 8.62) as ‘lame ducks’, who, despite their 
adulthood, have either failed to achieve successful financial independence or who 
have become estranged from the deceased but claim that they should have been 
‘remembered’ or included in the disposition of the estate. Baynes v Hedger, of 
course, is a case of this type, albeit that the ‘child’ was not a natural child of the 
deceased.  
4.1. Claims by a surviving spouse/civil partner  
If the application is made by a surviving spouse or civil partner, reasonable 
financial provision means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all 
the circumstances of the case for a husband or wife (or civil partner) to receive, not 
limited to maintenance.26 The reason for this is that a surviving spouse or civil 
partner would normally expect to receive a share of the deceased spouse’s estate 
and it would be anomalous if the court was constrained to give her (or him) less 
after the other’s death than it could on divorce or dissolution. Indeed, under s 3(2), 
the court is required ‘to have regard to the provision which the applicant might 
reasonably have expected to receive if on the day on which the deceased died the 
marriage, instead of being terminated by the death, had been terminated by a 
decree of divorce’ and must consider a range of factors akin to those taken into 
account in a divorce, such as the duration of the marriage and the ‘contribution’ 
made by the applicant to the welfare of the family, including by looking after the 
home or caring for the family. 
But this is not a straightforward exercise. England and Wales has no matrimonial 
property regime. Property owned or acquired by a spouse or civil partner is held 
subject to the usual rules of property27 so that there is no automatic entitlement by 
one spouse to a share in the property of the other. The provision made on divorce 
                                                 
25 Social research suggests that charities are given low priority by those making wills. Humphrey et al. 
(2010, Table 3.2) found that only 7% of a sample of 622 respondents who had made a will had included 
a charity amongst the beneficiaries. 
26 Section 1(2) as amended. 
27 With some very limited statutory exceptions such as a claim to a share in the value of a property 
where a spouse has contributed to its ‘improvement’: s 37 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 
1970. 
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is governed by legislation which grants wide powers to the court to exercise a broad 
discretion to redistribute the ownership or enjoyment of property between the 
spouses.28 There is thus a significant difference in the legal starting-point taken to 
providing for a spouse who has been widowed and one whose marriage is ended by 
divorce. In the former case, in the absence of a will, he or she may expect to 
inherit up to the whole estate of the deceased under the intestacy rules,29 while if a 
will has been made, he or she could potentially be largely disinherited. In recent 
years in the divorce jurisdiction, provision for an applicant spouse (usually a wife) 
has shifted from an award limited to satisfying her ‘reasonable requirements’ – 
which fit quite well with the notion of ‘reasonable provision’ based on relieving need 
– to one governed by three guiding principles: satisfaction of need, compensation 
for relationship-generated disadvantage, but also sharing (usually equally) of the 
marital assets.30 How far should this principle of sharing operate in the family 
provision sphere, focused as it is on making only ‘reasonable provision’ for the 
surviving spouse or civil partner?  
The ‘divorce cross-check’, as it is known, has been considered in several cases. The 
leading authority, Fielden and Another v Cunliffe,31 was decided after the principle 
of fair sharing of assets was established by the House of Lords in White v White32 
but before it had been elaborated into the three principles just noted. The wife 
answered an advert for a housekeeper placed by the deceased, an elderly bachelor. 
She started work for him almost immediately after being interviewed for the post, 
and began cohabiting with him two months later. They married four months after 
that, and he died a year later. He made a will expressed to be in contemplation of 
his marriage (and therefore not revoked by it)33, leaving his estate, valued at some 
£1.4 million, on discretionary trust for the wife, several relatives and friends and 
employees of the family business. The wife sought a definite share of the estate 
rather than provision at the discretion of the trustees and so brought a claim. At 
first instance, the wife was awarded a lump sum of £800,000 and the executors 
appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the correct approach, following White v 
White, was to apply the statutory provisions to the facts of the individual case with 
the objective of achieving a result which is fair, and non-discriminatory. But it did 
not follow that an equal share should result, for the situation is not identical to that 
of a divorce. As Wall LJ put it: 
A marriage dissolved by divorce involves a conscious decision by one or both of the 
spouses to bring the marriage to an end. That process leaves two living former 
spouses, each of whom has resources, needs and responsibilities. … However, 
where the marriage, as here, is dissolved by death, a widow is entitled to say that 
she entered into it on the basis that it would be of indefinite duration, and in the 
expectation that she would devote the remainder of the parties’ joint lives to being 
[the deceased’s] wife and caring for him.34 
On the other hand,  
a deceased spouse who leaves a widow, is entitled to bequeath his estate to 
whomsoever he pleases: his only statutory obligation is to make reasonable 
financial provision for his widow. In such a case, depending on the value of the 
estate, the concept of equality may bear little relation to such provision.35 
His Lordship thus drew attention to the fact that divorce and death are not 
equivalent situations as regards the financial position which ensues but he also 
                                                 
28 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Part II.  
29 Administration of Estates Act 1925 s 46. 
30 White v White [2001] 1 AC 596;Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 
618.  
31 [2005] EWCA Civ 1508, [2006] Ch 361 at [30]. 
32 [2001] 1 AC 596. 
33 Wills Act 1837 s 18(3) (as amended).  
34 Fielden v Cunliffe [2005] EWCA Civ 1508, [2006] 1 FLR 745 at [30]. 
35 Fielden v Cunliffe [2005] EWCA Civ 1508, [2006] 1 FLR 745 at [21]. 
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noted the significance of the principle of freedom of testation which must be 
recognized to some degree. Without either a matrimonial property regime or a 
system of fixed shares on death providing the legal backdrop to the application of 
discretion, the Inheritance Act therefore allows, but also limits how far the court is 
to accommodate the claim of the surviving spouse. The Court of Appeal concluded 
that the brevity of the marriage36 and the fact that the widow had made only a very 
small contribution to the family wealth were factors militating against equality of 
division in ensuring ‘reasonable’ provision in this case and reduced the award to 
£600,000 – still nearly 45% of the total estate, but the deceased had no children, 
so the award reflects the priority given by the general public to a spouse over more 
remote kin, and especially non-relatives (Humphrey et al. 2010, Ch 6).  
By contrast, P v G, P and P (Family Provision: Relevance of Divorce Provision)37 
concerned another housekeeper turned wife. However, the marriage lasted much 
longer – about 20 years – but there were two children from the deceased’s former 
marriage in competition with the widow over the estate, which was worth some 
£4.5 million. Again, the deceased left a will establishing a number of discretionary 
trusts and the defendants conceded that this did not make reasonable provision for 
the widow. The marriage had been in difficulties and the spouses separated for a 
few months before an uneasy reconciliation was cut short by the deceased suffering 
a fall and dying during surgery. So here, the divorce comparison had greater 
traction than might have been the case after a happy marriage, although the trial 
judge regarded it as artificial and declined to be constrained by viewing a likely 
divorce award as representing either a floor or ceiling to what might be ordered 
under the Inheritance Act jurisdiction.38 Here, the judge regarded the widow as 
having made a significant contribution to the welfare of the family, although she 
was clearly seen as a ‘step mother’ by the deceased’s children of his former 
marriage, not as their ‘mother’. Ultimately, however, the trial judge attached little 
weight to this issue. She made her order based largely on what she felt the widow 
required for a comfortable old age and compared the amount this would take (40% 
of the estate, plus a pension of £90,000 per annum already in payment) with what 
the children would receive, satisfying herself that they would all do very well.  
These cases involved significant assets. A different scenario applied in Iqbal v 
Ahmed.39 There, the deceased had a son from a former marriage. His wife came 
from Pakistan to marry him and spoke little English. The marriage lasted 22 years, 
and she was entirely dependent upon him for financial support, although she had 
managed to save £3000 from the ‘pocket money’ he gave her. Shortly before he 
died, the deceased made a will giving the widow a right to occupy the marital home 
rent-free, but responsible for all outgoings and repairs, with the son inheriting the 
legal title. The home was valued at around £115,000, but required some £30,000 
of repairs, which the widow could not afford.  
The deceased made no other provision for her. He also drafted a ‘Memorandum of 
Wishes’ in which he stated that  
... she has not been a loving and caring wife before and during my illness. She also 
acts compulsively and repetitively and gives me verbal abuse and physical abuse.40 
The first instance judge summed up the widow’s position: 'She has been diagnosed 
as suffering from depression. Her grasp of English is poor. She has no history of 
                                                 
36 For another example of the short duration of the marriage affecting the award, see Lilleyman v 
Lilleyman [2012] EWHC 821 (Ch) [2013] 1 FLR 47. 
37 [2004] EWHC 2944 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 431.  
38 The Law Commission (2011, para 2.146) recommended that the legislation should make clear that the 
divorce analogy should not be treated as setting either an upper or lower limit on the award and this has 
been done by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 Sch 2 para 5(2). 
39 [2011] EWCA Civ 900, [2012] 1 FLR 31. 
40 For discussion of the significance of the testator’s expression of wishes and feelings in a will and 
related documents, see Hacker (2010). 
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employment in the UK. She has virtually no earning capacity' and did not appear to 
be well integrated into the wider society around her. She was somewhat eccentric 
and inclined to 'compulsive and repetitive behaviour'.41 
However, while the judge accepted she may not have been easy to live with, he 
noted that she had cared for the deceased when he was ill and throughout a long 
marriage, had kept house and cooked for him. It was accepted that the provision 
was not reasonable, and the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s award of a half 
share in the property, rather than a mere right to occupy for life. Important factors 
here were the length of the marriage (as opposed to its brevity in Fielden) and the 
deep hostility between the widow and the deceased’s son. So here, the widow 
received an equal share in the marital home (which would be regarded as 
‘matrimonial property’ available for sharing in the divorce jurisdiction) and the 
ability, through sale, to convert this to capital to provide a ‘cushion’ for her future 
needs. The ‘deserving’ nature of this widow, in the view of the courts, is apparent: 
despite what the deceased thought about her, she had performed her wifely duties 
(although it is worth noting that had there been no child, or had the deceased died 
intestate, she would have inherited the entire estate). 
It is interesting to compare the case law with the evidence of public attitudes 
towards the competing claims of spouses/partners and the children of the deceased 
from a former relationship. Humphrey et al. (2010, Table 5.1) found that, when 
asked to comment on how the intestacy rules should allocate the estate as between 
these competing beneficiaries, there was stronger support for the widow than the 
children, with 46% of respondents favouring the widow receiving all or taking 
priority over adult children, compared with 18% who favoured the children. Just 
over a third proposed sharing the estate equally between them. Of course, views 
may differ where the deceased had expressed his wishes regarding the position of 
the widow through his will; one might expect greater weight to be given to how he 
deliberately proposed providing (or not) for her in such cases. Nonetheless, the 
statutory injunction that provision is not limited to ‘maintenance’, coupled with the 
courts’ approach in applying the divorce cross-check, appear to reflect the public 
recognition of the claim of a widow to due ‘recognition’ in inheritance law.  
4.2. Claims by a cohabitant of the deceased 
For all claimants other than a spouse or civil partner, ‘reasonable provision’ is 
limited to maintenance, both in terms of whether such provision was made for them 
by will or under the intestacy rules, and if not, what provision should now be made. 
A cohabitant, therefore, despite being found to have lived with the deceased ‘as’ a 
spouse or civil partner, is not treated as such when it comes to the court’s exercise 
of discretion. Yet at the same time, the courts do speak the language of ‘obligation’ 
in describing the relationship with the deceased – even though no such legal 
obligation of support exists. Thus, in Webster v Webster, which was a cohabitation 
lasting ‘longer ... than many marriages’ (36 years), the judge affirmed that in 
‘those circumstances [the deceased] had a substantial obligation and responsibility 
towards [the claimant]’.42 Such an approach once more seems to reflect the 
attitudes revealed by the research conducted by Humphrey et al. (2010, Figs 4.1 
and 5.2) which showed that there is strong public support for cohabitants being 
included in the intestacy rules, but also that support for the partner is a) not as 
strong as for a spouse; and b) stronger the longer the couple have lived together.  
The cases have again primarily pitted the applicant against the children of the 
deceased by a former relationship. As with an application by a spouse or civil 
partner, the court must also have regard, under section 3(2A) to the age of the 
applicant, the length of the period of cohabitation, and the contribution made by 
                                                 
41 Iqbal v Ahmed [2011] EWCA Civ 900, [2012] 1 FLR 31 at [10]. 
42 [2008] EWHC 31 (Ch) at [39]. See also Cattle v Evans [2011] EWHC 945 (Ch), [2011] 2 FLR 843 (17 
years, with 2 year interruption). 
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the applicant to the welfare of the family or of the deceased, including any 
contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family. But it is 
arguably harder to determine what ‘reasonable provision’ should be for a cohabitant 
than for either a spouse or a dependant, precisely because the relationship between 
the couple will have been ‘marriage-like’ and yet the statute constrains the court to 
considering what is reasonable as ‘maintenance’.  
How far, for example, should the court have regard to the lifestyle that the couple 
enjoyed together, as compared to what the surviving partner ‘needs’ for her future 
support? In Negus v Bahouse,43 a wealthy businessman, who had been married 
twice before and had adult children, formed a relationship with a younger woman 
and invited her to move in with him. He had made his will, which did not include 
her, shortly before they began cohabiting, and did not change it during their eight 
years together. The applicant claimed they were engaged (which would not have 
altered her legal status regarding the estate but might have helped emphasise the 
quasi-marital nature of their relationship), but there was some dispute about this. 
Nonetheless, as the trial judge put it,  
The relationship … suited them both. He wanted a devoted female friend, 
companion and lover and got it. She wanted security and a roof over her head.44 
The judge found that  
Her life had changed in eight years, no doubt allowing for the ups and doubts and 
vicissitudes of life, nevertheless, much for the better. It does seem to me that 
lifestyle or ‘tone’ … is at least to be taken into account.45 
He concluded: 
In my judgment, having regard to her age, the length of time she was with Henry, 
the factual background that I have previously mentioned, the fact that he paid for 
everything and provided her with a home and to the promises she made to him 
about a roof over her head,46 she is entitled at least to a reasonable degree of 
financial security and a degree of comfort for the rest of her life.47 
She was awarded assets worth £500,000 out of an estate worth £2.2 million, 
already having assets worth around £370,000. Here, the bargain struck by the 
couple – ‘security and a roof over her head’ in exchange for being the deceased’s 
‘companion’ and her completion of her side of the bargain over a reasonably long 
period enabled the court to provide her with an award which would reflect her 
having ‘earned’ her share.  
When reviewing the law, the Law Commission (2009, paras 4.130, 4.134) initially 
argued that taking account of lifestyle during the cohabitation is correct in that it 
recognises that a cohabiting relationship goes beyond one of mere dependency, 
includes mutual contributions and gives due regard to its duration, and they 
recommended that a cohabitant’s claim should not be limited to maintenance but 
should instead be defined as ‘such financial provision as it would be reasonable in 
all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive, whether or not that 
provision is required for the applicant’s maintenance.’ However, after consulting, 
they withdrew their recommendation (Law Commission 2011, paras 8.164-8.165). 
Pending implementation of the Law Commission’s (or other) proposals for reform of 
the law governing property allocation when a cohabiting couple separate, there is 
no ‘cross-check’ akin to that of divorce which can be applied to determine how to 
calibrate a family provision award for a cohabitant. They did, however, suggest 
that, should financial remedies be introduced for cohabitants who separate, the 
                                                 
43 Negus v Bahouse [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch), [2008] 1 FCR 768. 
44 Negus v Bahouse [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch), [2008] 1 FCR 768, at [28]. 
45 Negus v Bahouse [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch), [2008] 1 FCR 768, at [88]. 
46 That is, that she would give up work and look after him and in return, he would give her a roof over 
her head.  
47 Negus v Bahouse [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch), [2008] 1 FCR 768, at [87]. 
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position regarding the maintenance standard should be reviewed. In the meantime, 
the nature of the relationship between the parties, the extent to which the claimant 
fulfilled her role as the partner of the deceased, and a comparison between her 
standard of living in the absence of an award, and what she would have enjoyed 
had the relationship continued, are factors to which the courts give weight. Once 
this is done, the relief of hardship, relative both to the prior lifestyle, and that of 
the competing beneficiaries, will determine the award made.48 
4.3. Adult children of the deceased  
The final category of claimants concerns Kerridge and Brierley’s ‘lame ducks’. These 
are adult children of the deceased who have either been excluded from the will, or 
whose claim on intestacy is superseded by that of a surviving spouse. At first sight, 
the recognition of the adult child’s claim appears to mark a reversion to the 
traditional centrality of heirship in inheritance law. However, the concern here is not 
to ensure that wealth remains within the family (where the ‘heir’ is merely the next 
guardian of the patrimony) but rather to acknowledge the claim of the child, based 
on his or her individual needs, to be supported beyond the death of the deceased. 
Such ‘children’ challenge the usual assumption in English law that, once they reach 
adulthood, financial responsibility (as distinct from the tie of affection) towards 
one’s children terminates. In a time when reaching autonomous adulthood appears 
to be a lengthening process, both from an economic and emotional perspective, and 
in an era when the centrality of the ‘child’ as the true focus of the family ‘project’ is 
increasingly felt (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, Ch 4) the extent to which law 
should recognize a legal ‘obligation’ as stretching into adulthood has assumed 
greater importance. But it raises a further dilemma for legal and social policy when 
put alongside the supposedly reciprocal yet clearly only moral obligation (in England 
and Wales anyway)49 of caring for one’s parents in their old age in a context of 
shrinking pensions, increased longevity and the inadequacy of state or commercial 
provision of adult care. 
Espinosa v Bourke50 illustrates the dilemma very clearly. The appellant had been 
married five times and had numerous partners and she had no secure means of 
earning her living. She had a son, who moved to live with his grandparents after 
falling out with her. When the grandmother died, her father and son moved in with 
her, the father meeting all the household expenses and paying off her mortgage. 
He promised her that she would benefit from the estate which he had inherited 
from her mother when he died. However, the appellant spent most of the last year 
of the father’s life in Spain where she married yet again, bringing her husband back 
to live with her in England. Her father relied on ‘meals on wheels’ and carers during 
much of that time and he changed his will leaving his entire estate (worth about 
£196,000) to her son, stating that the appellant ‘has, during my lifetime, been 
adequately provided for and she has also shown, in my opinion, a degree of 
irresponsibility.’51 The trial judge regarded her as having shown minimal 
commitment to the father and dismissed her claim that reasonable provision had 
not been made for her.  
There has been confusion in the case-law concerning whether, for an adult child 
who is capable of earning his or her own living, some sort of ‘moral obligation’ must 
be owed by the deceased to the child, or some other special circumstances must 
exist, to justify making (further) provision for him or her from the estate. Indeed, 
section 3(1) of the Act requires the court to take into account ‘any obligations and 
responsibilities which the deceased had towards’ the applicant, and ‘any other 
                                                 
48 See for example, Baker v Baker and Another [2008] EWHC 937 (Ch), [2008] 3 FCR 547. 
49 Compare other jurisdictions such as Singapore (Maintenance of Parents Act 1995); Canada (eg 
Ontario Family Law Act 1990 s 32); Italy (Civil Code art 315). 
50 [1999] 1 FLR 747, CA. 
51 [1999] 1 FLR 747, CA at p 749E.The text provides another example of the expression of the testator’s 
feelings; see Hacker (2010).  
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matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which … the 
court may consider relevant.’ These provisions certainly leave scope for the court to 
consider both the way in which the deceased acted towards the claimant, and how 
the claimant behaved towards the deceased. The cases have now made clear that it 
is not a pre-requisite for an adult claimant to establish that the deceased owed 
some kind of moral responsibility to him or her.52 But, in fact, the Court found that 
the promise to make provision for the daughter in his will did impose an obligation 
on the deceased against which the claimant’s behaviour towards him should be 
weighed. Taking these and the claimant’s very difficult financial circumstances into 
account, coupled with the fact that the grandson would be adequately provided for, 
it concluded that reasonable provision had not been made for her and she was 
awarded £60,000 (nearly one-third of the estate).  
The case illustrates the difficulty of weighing familial obligations, derived not from 
law but from the way the parties chose to live their lives and relate to each other, 
but it also illustrates how central such family ‘practices’ are to understanding how 
the court reaches its conclusion on the claim. If one might feel that the daughter 
was ‘lucky’ in this case, the opposite conclusion might be drawn from Garland v 
Morris.53 Here, the claimant was the younger of two daughters. Their mother left 
the father; the claimant remained living with him but they had a very poor 
relationship and eventually she moved out to live with a friend’s family. Her mother 
later committed suicide. The mother left her estate, worth £33,000, to the 
claimant, who used it to buy a house to live in, but she subsequently became 
dependent on social security benefits. The father disapproved of her lifestyle as an 
unmarried mother, and the claimant had no contact with him beyond occasional 
letters and cards for the last 15 years of his life. When the father died, he left his 
whole estate (of some £284,000) to his elder daughter. Despite the very difficult 
financial circumstances in which the claimant was living and the disparity between 
her and her sister’s financial circumstances, the judge rejected her claim, finding 
that the claimant ‘could not be bothered’ to try to meet up with the father (and he 
did not appear to wish to meet up with her either).54 Here, the poor relationship 
between the two (and the fact that the claimant had benefited from her mother’s 
will) was held to justify her exclusion from being provided for from the father’s 
estate. Once again, it was the nature and quality of the relationship between the 
deceased and the claimant that determined whether such exclusion was 
‘reasonable’.55 
In these cases, the claimant was in competition with other close family members 
for a share in the estate – her own son in the former, and her sister in the latter. In 
Ilott v Mitson,56 the daughter was in competition with a number of animal charities 
for an estate worth around £486,000.57 She had become estranged from her 
mother when she married, against her mother’s wishes, at the age of 17 and 
attempts at reconciliation thereafter had failed. The daughter was in modest 
circumstances; she had not worked since the birth of her first child, her husband 
worked irregularly, and they now had five children and lived in rented 
accommodation and relied on welfare benefits. In a striking illustration of how the 
formation of intimate relationships is now viewed, the first instance judge rejected 
the argument by the charities that the daughter could not complain about lack of 
                                                 
52 Re Hancock (Deceased) 1998] 2 FLR 346, CA; Re Pearce (Deceased) [1998] 2 FLR 705, CA and cases 
discussed below. 
53 [2007] EWHC 2 (Ch), [2007] 2 FLR 528. 
54 [2007] EWHC 2 (Ch), [2007] 2 FLR 528 At [15], [56]. 
55 See, to similar effect, Leslie (1996, pp. 255-258).By contrast, in relation to intestacy provision – 
admittedly a different situation from that in this case - social attitudinal research (Humphrey et al. 2010, 
p. 53) found a strong preference for treating children equally, even where siblings might have different 
levels of need or different degrees of closeness with the deceased parent. 
56 [2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] 2 FLR 170. 
57 In an interesting aside, Wall P (at [1]) notes that there was no evidence to suggest the mother had 
any particular interest in, or love of, animals or birds! 
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financial provision ‘if she decides against her mother’s will, to throw in her lot with 
a man rather than remain with her mother’. Rather, in his opinion (with which the 
Court of Appeal agreed), ‘[a] daughter is entitled (indeed would be expected) to 
make a life with a partner of her choice and have a family of her own. She would 
reasonably hope that a parent would accept such a choice, and not blame her for 
it.’58 
The essence of the case was the ‘value judgment’ which the court had to exercise in 
determining whether making no provision for her estranged daughter was 
‘reasonable provision’ in the circumstances. It should be stressed that the test is 
not whether the decision itself was ‘reasonable’ – the focus is on the outcome for 
the claimant, not the behaviour of the deceased. But as we have seen, the only way 
the judge can reach a conclusion on this is to consider that behaviour, alongside 
the conduct of the claimant, and the other factors listed in the statute.  
5. Conclusion  
The Inheritance Act represents a significant inroad into the principle of 
testamentary freedom in English law, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that 
both Parliament and the courts have attempted to keep its scope within bounds 
that focus on family-like relationships and on the relative financial hardship faced 
by the claimant. The eligibility rules use a combination of traditional family 
structure – spouse or partner and offspring of the deceased – and family practice – 
reflected in factual dependency upon the deceased – to mark out who may seek to 
obtain provision from a person’s estate. Once a claim is eligible to be heard, it then 
falls to the applicant to justify the claim based on whether ‘reasonable provision’ 
has been made for them. This judgment is a ‘value judgment’, say the courts, and 
one which is difficult to set aside on appeal. The result is that in reaching the 
threshold value judgment, the judge is thrown back on ‘common sense’, and his or 
her own understandings of appropriate family behaviour and norms. This explains 
why there has to be a detailed factual exploration of the relationship between the 
deceased and the claimant rather than a simple comparison of the claimant’s living 
standard with that of the deceased and other beneficiaries. It is how the parties 
behaved towards each other which will determine whether reasonable provision has 
been made. This demonstrates that, as suggested above, while the legislation 
might appear to demand evidence of an asymmetric relationship in which the 
claimant was dependent upon the deceased, the court, echoing Finch’s findings 
(1989) regarding the recognition of family obligations, looks for a mutual and 
reciprocal relationship between them if the claim is to succeed. 
In cases concerning spouses or cohabiting partners, the behaviour the court is 
looking for must be ‘spousal’ (or quasi-spousal) in nature. Has the widow/er shown 
that the relationship was a proper marriage, did he or she care for the deceased, 
did he or she take on a quasi-parental role to the deceased’s other children, and so 
on? How long did the marriage or cohabitation last, such that the claimant can be 
shown to have ‘earned’ an entitlement? And the lifestyle enjoyed by the couple 
when the deceased was alive will be used as a benchmark in assessing what 
provision should be made now, even where the claim is limited to ‘maintenance’ 
and even though the purpose of the jurisdiction is relief from hardship. For 
hardship, just as is the case when assessing ‘needs’ in a divorce, is a relative 
concept dependent upon the particular facts of the case and the size of the estate.  
Where adult children are the applicants, some sense of filial responsibility appears 
to be expected. A child who ignores her parent or (like the god-daughter in Baynes 
v Hedger) makes excessive demands on the deceased’s wealth, has not behaved 
                                                 
58 Quoted by Wall P in Ilott v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] 2 FLR 170 at [55]. The case was 
remitted to a different judge to determine quantum and the claimant was ultimately awarded £50,000: 
Ilott v Mitson [2014] EWHC 542 (Fam) which may be seen as striking a balance between the principle of 
testamentary freedom and the relief of hardship.  
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appropriately and may find herself excluded. Indeed, the insistence of the courts 
that there is no requirement to show that the deceased owed a particular moral 
obligation to the claimant becomes turned round to an effective requirement on the 
part of the claimant to show that he or she fulfilled the obligation of a child to show 
concern for a parent during his or her lifetime. These judgments are not easily 
predictable however and sometimes appear rather a lottery. As we saw, while in 
Garland v Morris the daughter’s estrangement from her father was regarded by the 
court as a failing on her part which helped justify her exclusion from his will, in Ilott 
v Mitson the daughter’s marrying against her mother’s wishes was excused and 
indeed, the mother was criticized for having spurned efforts at reconciliation. One 
explanation suggested (Cownie and Bradney 2003) for such differing outcomes is 
that judges from two different jurisdictions – Family and Chancery – may hear the 
claim and that while judges of the Family Division focus on the details of the 
relationship between claimant and deceased, Chancery judges spend little time in 
pondering these, being more concerned to analyze the legal provisions. The cases 
discussed in this paper were decided mainly at appellate level, by a mix of judges 
with both Family and other judicial experience so it is difficult to say whether their 
judicial ‘culture’ and mind-set might have influenced their approach. Indeed, all 
seem to have scrutinized the factual circumstances in great depth, including in 
Garland v Morris – even though that case was in fact decided by a Chancery judge. 
It might well be that judges with different legal backgrounds assess factual 
circumstances differently, but one would need a much larger sample to reach such 
a conclusion, and that is not the claim being made here.  
English law, especially family law, is often criticized for its reliance on unstructured 
discretion. The insistence in the family provision jurisprudence that the court is 
engaged in a ‘value judgment’ is open to even greater challenge. As Black LJ noted 
in Ilott v Mitson, 
A dispassionate study of each of the matters set out in s 3(1) will not provide the 
answer to the question whether the will makes reasonable financial provision for 
the applicant, no matter how thorough and careful it is. …. So between the 
dispassionate study and the answer to the first question lies the value judgment to 
which the authorities have referred. It seems to me that the jurisprudence reveals 
a struggle to articulate, for the benefit of the parties in the particular case and of 
practitioners, how that value judgment has been, or should be, made on a given set 
of facts. Inevitably, this has led to statements that this or that matter is not enough 
to found a claim and this or that matter is required.59 
This paper has argued that the only way one can ‘articulate’ how that judgment is 
made, is by understanding that what the judges are doing is using their own 
experience of family practices and norms to assess the family tie between deceased 
and applicant, taking due account of how that family itself ‘operated’ and what 
norms it shared. In so doing, the law can be used dynamically to determine which 
kinds of relationship, and what qualities of emotional or supportive bonds, should 
be recognized as giving rise to a ‘sense of obligation’, as Janet Finch would put it, 
to provide some financial provision for the applicant.  
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